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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeal has jurisdiction of this appeal from a Third District bench 
trial pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
and PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in finding an "agreement" for the issuance of 2.5 
million disputed shares of NexMed, Inc. stock to Mann, and are the trial court's findings of 
fact incomplete, insufficient and inconsistent? 
Standard and Preservation: The existence of a contract is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness1. The adequacy of findings of fact is a also a questions of law.2 
Issues were preserved through Company filed objections to proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R. 143 and closing argument. See e.g., R.l 115 at p. 61 l(lns. 10-25), p. 
612 (Ins. 1-9), p. 615 (lns.12-14). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in its failure to apply the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, Ex. P-3 to void and bar the indefinite "agreement" found by the trial court? 
Standard and Preservation: Contract interpretation, including determinations of 
whether ambiguities exist, is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.3 Issue 
]See Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. OuinteL 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1992). 
2Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v Harrison, 
2003 UT 14, H 28, 70 P.3d 35, 43; Woodward v Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991). 
3See Webbank v American General Annuity Service Corp, 2002 UT 88, ffif 19,22, 54 
P.3d 1139; Dixon v Pro Image. Inc. 1999 UT 89, ffif 13-14, 987 P.2d 48, 52. 
preserved at Company's closing argument. See, e.g., R.l 115 at p. 612 (In. 7) through p. 619 
(In. 15). 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in not applying Nevada Revised Statutes 
§§ 78.211 and 78.315 to allow cancellation of the disputed shares by the Company when it 
was determined the statutes had not been complied with, no valid agreement for the shares 
existed and consideration for the stock was lacking? 
Standard and Preservation: Statutory interpretation and legislative intent are legal 
issues reviewed under the standard of correctness?4 Issue preserved in Pre-Trial Order, 
R.879-880 and discussed extensively through trial and as part of the Company's closing 
argument. See, e.g., R.l 115 at p. 623 (In. 13) through p. 627 (In. 5); p. 628 (Ins. 1-13); p. 631 
(Ins. 7-23); p. 669 (In. 13) through p. 676 (In. 17). 
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err in determining Mann did not have to prove the 
adequacy of consideration and inherent fairness of the transaction? Did the trial court err in 
concluding that the Disputed Shares of the Company, as of April 11,1994, had no significant 
value? 
Standard and Preservation: The issues involve mixed issues of law and fact, reviewed 
for both correctness and the clearly erroneous standard. The issue of consideration is one of 
4See, State v Larson, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993): State v Mitchell 824 P.2d 
469, 471-72 (Utah App. 1991); State v Waite. 803 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1990). See 
also, Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement District. 958 P.2d 222, 224-25 
(Utah 1998). 
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law which is reviewed for correctness. Issue preserved in the Pre-Trial Order (R.879-881). 
See also Objections to Findings and Conclusions, R.l43, and closing argument. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err in concluding the Business Consulting Agreement 
(Ex. P-22) was not relevant to the issues before the trial court? 
Standard and Preservation: Issues of relevance are reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. However, interpretation of contract, which goes to relevance, is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Issue preserved during Company's closing 
argument. See, e.g., R.l 115 at p. 636 (In. 17) through p. 639 (In. 5). 
Issue No. 6: Did the trial court err in failing to apportion the number of disputed 
shares if the consideration for the shares was future consideration? 
Standard and Preservation: The issues involve mixed issues of law and fact, reviewed 
for both correctness and the clearly erroneous standard. Issues preserved as part of the 
Company's closing argument. See, e.g., R.l 115 at p. 642 (In. 3) through p. 644 (In. 5). 
Issue No. 7: Did the trial court err in relying upon the "delay" between the issuance 
of the shares and the Company's Board of Directors' decision to cancel and rescind the 
Disputed Shares, where Appellees waived any issues relating to relating to estoppel, laches, 
or statute of limitations and did not present evidence on the same? 
Standard and Preservation: This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness and 
preserved in Plaintiffs' Closing Argument. See, e.g., R.l 115 at p. 644 (In. 17) through p. 647 
(In. 4). See also trial court discussion on the interpretation of the Pretrial Order at R.l 115 at 
p. 648 (Ins. 6-17), p. 649 (Ins. 24-25). 
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Issue No. 8: Did the trial court err in not admitting into evidence a federal indictment 
against Mann for conspiracy, sale of unregistered securities, mail fraud, and wire fraud, in 
a massive Ponzi scheme involving more than $23,000,000? 
Standard and Preservation: Admissibility of evidence is a legal question, with trial 
court's being given some discretion. See, e.g., Gorosticta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99 f 14,17 
P.3d 1110. Preserved at trial. R. 1114 at p. 496 (Ins. 5) through p. 497 (In. 17). The trial court 
sustained Appellees' objection at R.l 114 at p. 497 (In. 21). 
Issue No. 9: Did the trial court err in excluding misrepresentation evidence submitted 
by Castleberry when no objection was made when she testified? 
Standard and Preservation. Exclusion of evidence and claims, after close of trial, 
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Issue discussed at closing argument. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Statutory provisions are from the Nevada Revised Statutes, i.e., NRS § 78.211 
andNRS§ 78.315. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Board of Directors of NexMed, Inc. ("Company") adopted an unanimous consent 
resolution canceling and rescinding the issuance of 2.5 million shares of Company stock 
(hereafter sometimes "Disputed Shares") to the Somerset Group, Inc. ("Somerset"), a 
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corporation owned by Clealon Mann ("Mann")5. The Company then filed this declaratory 
action seeking an order approving the cancellation and rescission of the Disputed Shares. 
The Company' s complaint is based, inter alia, on claims that the Disputed Shares were 
issued in violation of the Nevada statutes, that the resolution authorizing the issuance of 
shares had been forged, that NexMed had not received adequate consideration and that the 
Asset Purchase Agreement voided and barred the issuance of the Shares. 
After a bench trail the trial court found in favor of the Mann, Somerset and Genie 
Total Products, Inc. ("Genie"), another corporation controlled by Mann. The trial court then 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a final judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
NexMed, Inc., is a Nevada corporation and is a public company in that it has 
numerous shareholders. The Company was formerly known as Target Capital, Inc., and Bio-
Electric, Inc. In 1993-1994, the Company had more than 120 shareholders. Ex. P-5. 
In 1993 and the early part of 1994, Mann had a controlling interest in the Company 
and all three members of board of directors and officers were serving at his request. In that 
regard, Genie owned 1.25 Million shares of Company stock. Mann was the president of 
Genie. Throughout December 1993 and into January 1994, Mann referred to himself as a 
consultant for the Company. See Exs. P-12 and P-14. 
5In October 1995 there was a twenty into one reverse split for all Company's issued 
and outstanding shares. Uncontroverted Facts, No. 2, Pretrial Order. (R.879-888.) The 
number of shares outstanding, as referenced in this brief, will follow the numbers, such as 
2.5 Million Disputed Shares, prior to the split which had the practical effect of both reducing 
the number of shares and increasing the value of such shares. 
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On December 17, 1993, the Company's president, Wendell Eves, signed the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, Ex. P-3, whereby the Company purchased a patent for a medical device 
for the treatment of herpes ("Herpes Devise") from Peter Lathrop ("Lathrop") and Steven 
Johnston ("Johnston"). Under the Asset Purchase Agreement the Company agreed to pay for 
the patent by issuing 4.0 Million shares of stock to Lathrop and 350,000 shares to Johnston, 
co-inventors on the patent. The Asset Purchase Agreement provided that none of the parties 
was paying a finder's fee. In addition, the parties warranted that there were no claims against 
the assets and the Company warranted that there were no options or warrants outstanding. 
The Asset Purchase Agreement included a merger clause which provided that all prior 
agreements were merged into the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Asset Purchase Agreement 
also called for replacing the Board of Directors of the Company with Lathrop, Johnston and 
Cherrie Castleberry ("Castleberry"), Lathrop's wife. One of the pre-conditions to closing was 
the Company had to call and hold a shareholders' meeting to vote on approval of the actions 
agreed to in the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
After the Asset Purchase Agreement was signed, the then Company's directors held 
a board meeting on January 5,1994. (See Ex. P-4.) Nothing was brought before the directors, 
at that time, pertaining to any consulting agreement. (See Ex. P-4.) The directors at the 
meeting adopted resolutions calling a shareholders' meeting and setting the resolutions to be 
voted on by the shareholders. The directors also instructed the officers to solicit proxies from 
the shareholders. The Company sent a proxy statement dated January 7, 1994, to its 
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shareholders. (See Ex. P-9.) A proxy statement is only a disclosure document and is part of 
the proxy solicitation process. (R.l 112, p. 112, Ins. 15-18.) 
A draft of the Proxy Statement was faxed to Mann and Mann made corrections and 
filled in blanks. See Ex. P-6. The Proxy Statement referred to a 36 month consulting 
agreement between the Company and Somerset which the Company intended to enter into 
in exchange for 2.5 million shares to Somerset. 
At the meeting the Company's shareholders approved three proposals. See Notice of 
Shareholders Meeting, Proxy, and Proxy Statement. See Exs. P-7, P-8, and P-9. The 
shareholders meeting was held on January 18,1994. Mann served as secretary of the meeting. 
The minutes of the shareholders meeting reflect that there were 5,214,000 shares issued and 
outstanding and that there were 2,710,962 shares represented and voting at the meeting. See 
Ex. P-10. Genie's 1,250,000 shares were part of the shares establishing a quorum and voting. 
R.1112, p. 118, Ins. 12-24 and p. I l l , Ins. 20-25 and p. 112, Ins. 1-4. The Company's 
shareholders approved all three resolutions. See Ex. P-10. The shareholders did not vote, 
however, on any resolution regarding the 36 month Somerset consulting agreement because, 
at best, it was an agreement to agree. See Ex. P-9. 
Sometime in the December 1993 to April 1994 time period a Business Consultant 
Agreement was prepared and signed between the Company and Genie. See Ex. P-22. The 
precise date this document was signed is unknown. R.l 112, p. 110,1ns. 12-24 and p. 111,1ns. 
20-25 and p. 12, Ins. 1-4. Mann gave the document an effective date of December 1, 1993. 
Mann backdated the document to December 1,1993, and Mann signed Wendell Eves' name, 
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who in December 1993, was the Company's president. See R.1112, p. 112, Ins. 1-4. But 
compare R.l 113, p. 420, Ins. 13-25 and p. 421, Ins. 1-8. 
Under the Business Consultant Agreement, Genie, through Mann, was to provide all-
inclusive consulting services to the Company for a term of 36 months. He was to work not 
more than 20 hours per week and be paid $12,500 per month. Attached to the Business 
Consultant Agreement was an Addendum granting to Genie exclusive marketing rights to the 
Herpes Device. See Ex. P-22 [last page]. Mann said the consideration for the Addendum and 
the infomercial marketing rights was all the services he previously performed for the 
Company. 
In December 1993 Mann began selling shares and notes to investors and continued 
to at least June 28, 1994. Most shares were sold at $.07 per share. See Exs. P-47 and P-15. 
Further, based on a corporate resolution Ray Brown and Tim Hanson made a $50,000 loan 
to the Company which could be converted into stock at 70% of the highest ask price among 
the market makers for the Company's stock. See Ex. P-2. On February 25, 1994 April 11, 
1994, they converted their notes and Ray Brown received 357,142 and 142,857 shares and 
Tim Hanson received 357,142 and 142,857 shares of the Company's common stock. During 
the relevant time period there was a public trading market for the Company's shares and ask 
prices were available at a price of at least $.07. See Exs. P-2 and P-18, P-19, and P-20. 
Mann sold the Company's shares to investors and received a 15% commission on all 
his sales. Mann, who was not a broker, received commissions of almost $20,000 for his sales 
from December 1993 through June 1994. See Exs. P-15 and P-47. 
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On April 11,1994, the directors signed an Unanimous Consent Resolution (Ex. P-18) 
issuing shares to Peter Lathrop and Steven Johnston in the amount of 4.0 Million shares and 
350,000 respectively. The Unanimous Consent Resolution also issued 2.5 Million shares to 
Genie. See. Ex. P-18. Mann subsequently altered the Unanimous Consent Resolution by 
striking through Genie and inserting Somerset Group. R.l 112, p. 153, Ins. 24-25. He then 
caused the first page of the Unanimous Consent Resolution to be retyped and then he 
attached the signatures of the three directors to the altered Resolution. Mann did not obtain 
approval from the directors for his alteration and change. 
The Unanimous Consent Resolution of April 11, 1994, failed to determine the 
consideration the Company received for the shares, especially the 2.5 Million Disputed 
Shares, as required by the Nevada Revised Statutes. It is only these Shares that are in 
question in this matter. At $.07 per share the 2,500,000 shares had a value of $175,000. 
When the Company sought to obtain financing, Mann provided an affidavit explaining 
how he obtained, through Somerset the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares. He stated, in part: 
The Somerset Group, Inc., is a Nevada corporation, subchapter S corporation. 
Somerset signed a "Financial Consulting" with Bioelectric Inc. for a period of 
three years. In consideration BioElectric, Inc. tendered two-million five-
hundred thousand shares of restricted Rule 144 stock,. . . [Ex. P-24.] 
Mann later threatened to remove Peter Lathrop as president and as a director. Lathrop 
then fired Mann by letter dated July 26, 1994. See Ex. P-25. R.l 116, p. 64, Ins. 8-25. This 
ended any relationship Mann had with the Company other than as a shareholder.6 
Subsequently, Mann was indicted by a federal grand jury in a massive Ponzi scheme 
and scheme to obtain money by fraudulent means for activities he was involved him after 
leaving the Company. See Ex. P-32. The Company offered P-32 but the trial court refused 
to admit P-32 into evidence. 
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Later, Vivian Liu ("Liu"), and the then Company Board of Directors, reviewed 
Company records to determine more information as to the Disputed Shares. Neither she nor 
they could not find any consideration for the Disputed Shares. R.1116, p. 19 and p. 67. 
Consequently, the Board of Directors cancelled the Disputed Shares. This lawsuit then 
commenced. 
The bench trial, on August 18 through 21, 2003, was before Judge Noel. The trial 
court denied the Company's request to uphold the cancellation of the Disputed Shares. The 
trial court then entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 4, 2004, 
(R.1040 to 1050) and entered a Final Judgment on June 1, 2004 (R.1093-1095). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The arguments of the Company are multifaceted and cover several issues. If the Court 
of Appeals rules in favor of the Company on any one argument, either reversal or a remand 
is appropriate. 
The Company's first claim is that there was no "agreement" for the Disputed Shares. 
The trial court found such an "agreement" but the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("Findings" or "Conclusions") are incomplete and fail to layout the basis of its determination. 
Regardless, at law, the essential elements of an agreement do not exist. 
Even if an "agreement" existed, the Asset Purchase Agreement either merged the 
agreement into itself or affirmative warranties within the Asset Purchase Agreement bar 
other "agreement's" enforceability. No finder's fee was to be paid and each party represented 
and warranted that no other agreement, liens etc existed. Those warranties and 
-10-
representations continued at least through the shareholder's meeting of January 18 and 
directly undercut Mann's claims. 
The Disputed Shares were issued pursuant to the altered Unanimous Consent 
Resolution. Also, Castleberry claims her signature was gained through misrepresentation. 
Regardless, the resolution did not follow Nevada law and was voidable by the 2000 Board 
of Directors. 
Mann was a defacto officer of the Company at all pertinent times surrounding the 
issuance of the Disputed Shares. In addition, by this stock position he had a controlling 
interest in the Company. As such, Mann owed a fiduciary duty to the Company and minority 
shareholders. This duty was violated when he gained the Disputed Shares. The trial court 
applied the wrong standard of review to determine the adequacy of the consideration, 
received by the Company for the Disputed Shares, and whether or not the transaction was 
inherently fair to the Company and minority shareholders. Indeed, the trial court appears to 
have paid no attention to the interest of the Company's minority shareholders. It upheld 
Lathrop's and Mann's division of Company shares between themselves, like the cutting of 
a "whole pie." 
Legal arguments also go to evidentiary and other rulings of the trial court. The trial 
court concluded that the Business Consulting Agreement was not relevant to the issues of the 
case, although Mann expressly testified the Disputed Shares were issued, at least in part, in 
consideration of the Business Consulting Agreement. Other rulings of the Court, disagreed 
to by the Company, are his refusal to accept into evidence the indictment issued against 
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Mann for bad acts (Mann has subsequently been convicted of those activities and is in 
Federal Prison), the trial court's refusal to consider the testimony of Castleberry, and the trial 
court's decision, after both sides rested, that "delay" was a factor in the case. 
The Company also urges the Appellate Court, to remand the case to the trial court, if 
reversal is not available under the other arguments, to have the Disputed Shares apportioned 
as, at best, they were issued for future consideration on a 36 month consulting contract and 
Mann only worked 6 months. 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO LEGALLY BINDING "AGREEMENT" EXISTED FOR THE 2.5 
MILLION SHARES. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT TO 
THE CONTRARY ARE INCOMPLETE, INCONSISTENT AND 
INADEQUATE 
In the trial court's Findings and Conclusions, the court found that in connection with 
the agreement for acquisition of the Herpes Devise, Lathrop and Mann entered into an 
"agreement" for issuance of the 2.5 Million Shares to Mann. ("Finding #4.") In December 
1993 or January 1994, Mann had a controlling interest in the Company, by virtue of owning, 
through Genie, 1.25 Million Shares of Company stock and directly controlled the Company 
through his hand-picked Directors. The trial court further found the Disputed Shares were 
being issued "for his work in behalf of Target and as compensation for his role in 
kickstarting the Company." (Finding #4.) Finding #4, together with Findings 6 and 13 are 
incomplete, inadequate and inconsistent to each other. The Findings relating to an 
"agreement" are also not supported by the evidence. 
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A. TRIAL COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE COMPLETE AND 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." In addition , such "factual findings must be 
complete and detailed." Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35,43, 2003 UT 
14, ^ [ 27. The extent of the required detail is explained as follows: 
|^28 For findings of fact to be adequate, they "must show that the 
court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence.' The findings 'shouldbe sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps 
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.'" Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Id. at % 28. See also, Woodward v Fazzio. 823 p.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).7 
Questions as to the completeness and "legal adequacy of the findings of fact and the 
legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of law, which [appellate courts] 
review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." InreC.K., 2000 UT APP, 
1f 17, 996 P.2d 1059. See also, Shar's Cars, LLC v Birschbach. 2004 UT APP 258, If 12, 97 
P.3d 724. Finally, "[t]here is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence 
7Another problem with the Findings of fact, which can justify remanding the matter 
back to a trial court, is where the lower court uses words or terms which are subject to 
multiple meanings. See Woodward, id. at 478 and 748 n.6, where the Court of Appeals noted 
the use by the trial court of the word "token," to describe the number of contacts made by a 
father to a child, was an example of where a trial court's "statements provide no insight into 
the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision and render effective appellate review 
unfeasible." Here the trial court used "kickstart." 
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when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual 
determinations." Woodward v Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE COMPLETE AND 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF AN 
AGREEMENT FOR THE 2.5 MILLION DISPUTED SHARES. 
The Company asserts there was never a binding agreement or contract between the 
Company and Mann for the issuance of the Shares. The Court's Finding #4 directly rejects 
this claim, without specifying the "subsidiary facts" which form the basis of the statement: 
"It was also agreed ... that Clealon Mann would be awarded 2,500,000 shares for his work 
in behalf of Target and as compensation for his role in kickstarting the Company." 
The issue of whether or not a agreement exists between parties is a question of law. 
Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1992). To have a 
bilateral contract, there has to be evidence of, and findings of fact as to, the existence of an 
"offer and acceptance of the offer, supported by consideration, and be sufficiently detailed 
or definite to be enforceable. See, e.g., Cal Wadsworth Construction v St. George, 865 P.2d 
1373 (Utah App. 1994), affd 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995); Peirce v Peirce. 2000 UT 7,121 
& K 21n5; 994 P.2d 193; Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v Olch. 955 P.2d 357, 365 n.8 (Utah App. 
1998). 
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In this case, the trial court made no findings of fact with respect to any of the required 
elements of the alleged "agreement," which are essential subsidiary facts.8 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE INTERNALLY INCONSIS-
TENT. 
Not only are the Findings incomplete and inadequate, but they are also internally 
inconsistent. Finding #4 states that in December 1993 the alleged "agreement" was entered 
between Mann and Lathrop whereby Mann would receive the disputed 2.5 million shares for 
past services and "kickstarting" the Company. Finding #6 states the Proxy Statement, Ex. P-
9, makes references to "the proposal to issue 2,500,000 shares of Target to Somerset Group, 
Inc., a corporation controlled by Clealon Mann." The Proxy Statement states, however, the 
proposal to issue the disputed shares to Somerset is for a consulting services over 36 months, 
P-9 at p3, thereby changing the "consideration" from past services to future services. Finally, 
in Finding #13 the trial court states that by April 11, 1994, Mann (in the opinion of two 
former directors) had "already earned and paid fair value for the [disputed] shares." 
Because the trial court's Findings are incomplete, inadequate and inconsistent, the 
matter should be remanded back to the trial court for further consideration. See Armed 
Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison , 70 P.3d 35, 43, 2003 UT 14, Tj 27. 
8Finding #4 does not reference either an offer by the Company or Lathrop respecting 
the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares, or an acceptance of an offer. Indeed, the trial court states 
the "agreement" was between Mann [not the Company] and Lathrop. The possible recitation 
of consideration is also inadequate because it neither specifies what "work" Mann did in 
behalf of the Company nor does it define what the trial court intended by its use of the term 
"kickstarting." 
-15-
D. THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE OR LAW. 
The Court's Findings on the "agreement" for the Disputed Shares are not a model of 
clarity. As a consequence, it is difficult to "marshal evidence" in support of the Findings. See 
Woodward, at 477 supra. Nonetheless, to assist the appellate court, and in accordance with 
the instructions of the Court of Appeals to become the "devil's advocate," West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), the Company believes the 
following evidence supports the trial court's Findings regarding an "agreement" to issue the 
2.5 Million Disputed Shares to Somerset. 
1. Evidence Marshaled in Support of the Findings. 
Clealon Mann testified that an agreement existed supporting the Company's issuance 
of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares of stock to Mann or Genie or Somerset. In that regard, he 
testified the shares were issued pursuant to Business Consulting Agreement (Ex. P-22) and 
Proxy Statement (Ex. P-6) (Ex. P-9). See R.l 112 at p 66 (Ins. 12-19); R.l 112 at p. 102(lns. 
2-18); R.1112 at p. 104 (Ins 1-15); R.l 112 at p. 105 (Ins. 10-13). See also R.l 112 at p. 332 
(Ins. 8-10) Lathrop also testified 2,500,000 shares issued pursuant to a consulting agreement. 
Mann further testified the Business Consulting Agreement and Proxy Statement 
should be read together to find the agreement for the shares. See R. 1112 at p. 139 (In 25), p. 
140 (Ins. 1-11). 
Mann also testified, as found by the trial court in Finding #5, that the "agreement" was 
from the beginning of his dealings with Lathrop. Also that it was a "gentlemen's agreement." 
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See R. 1112 at p. 161 (In. 9) through p. 164 (In. 3). Mann did acknowledge to the Court that 
there was only one consideration for the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares.9 
Lathrop also testified that the agreement he had with Mann for shares of Company 
stock was from the beginning of their dealings with each other. 
Q [Barber] - Now, I believe that the date of this [Asset Purchase] agreement 
[Ex. P-3] is December 17th of 1993. And at or about that time, had - had you 
had discussions with Clealon Mann related to issuing additional shares of 
Target as a related transaction to this for consulting services to be performed 
by Mr. Mann? 
A [Lathrop] - Yes, I do. 
Q [Barber] - Now, did those discussions precede the signature of this asset 
purchase agreement or did they come later? If you recall. 
A [Lathrop] - You know, its hard to respond to a question like "a discussion 
regarding," because Clealon and I started years before that. And we had 
discussions on a daily basis. So frankly, it's hard for me to pinpoint whether 
a specific discussion on issuing him shares of stock for a particular reason 
occurred before this document or afterward. It was our intention all along to 
basically - and let me be clear in what I'm saying - basically split the available 
shares between us. 
Q [Barber] - Okay. So you - for your side, you would get a number of shares 
and Mann would get a similar number of shares for his contribution; is that 
right? 
A [Lathrop] - A similar number, yes. 
Q [Barber] - All right. 
R. 1113 at p. 305 (Ins. 2-24). 
9THE COURT - Now, you're talking - the 2.5 million that we're talking about here 
that you were to receive for the business consulting agreement -
THE WITNESS - the 2.5 million was something that was, from the very beginning, 
at the time we started doing the deal, the 2.5 million was always there. And that's why Wally 
Boyack put it into the proxy agreement. He understood what it was and that's why it's there. 
I didn't write the proxy statement. He -
THE COURT - So you were to get 2.5 million for the consulting agreement. 
THE WITNESS - Well, for the consulting agreement and staying on, even though the 
consulting agreement does not mention anything about the 2.5 million shares. But I -
THE COURT - Well, was there another two and a half million shares? 
THE WITNESS - No. This is the same two and a half million. 
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As for testimony supporting "consideration" for an "agreement" the record, again 
drawing all inferences in favor of the Findings of Fact, shows the follows: 
THE COURT - So you were to get the 2.5 million for the consulting 
agreement? 
THE WITNESS - Well, for the consulting agreement and staying on, even 
though the consulting agreement does not mention anything about the 2.5 
million shares. 
R.1112atp. 163(lns. 15-18). Similar testimony was offered by Mann in response to questions 
by his legal counsel, Mr. Barber, including that he was to get both deals, the Business 
Consulting Agreement and the Disputed Shares. See R. 1112 at p. 198(ln. 23) through p. 199 
(Ins. 1-20). 
Lathrop's testimony was different from Mann's in some respects, but also supported 
the concept of an agreement for the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares. 
Q. [Barber] - What was it that Clealon Mann was supposed to do for the Target 
shares that he was to get, pursuant to what was then an oral agreement that you 
had, I guess? 
A [Lathrop] - Oh quite - quite list. Raise capital, provide the vehicle for the 
company to go into the public venue. 
Q [Barber] - By that, you mean the shell? 
A [Lathrop] - Yeah. That's correct. Business support and financial support, 
and basic, in quotes, "partnership in co-venturing a - an entrepreneurial 
venture. [R.l 113 at p306(lns 3-11)]. 
2. The Evidence Is Legally Insufficient to Support Findings and 
Conclusions. 
Although the Mann's and Lathrop's testimony provides a sense of how the trial court 
could have found an "agreement" for the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares, the evidence simply 
does not satisfy the legal requirements for a trial court's finding of fact or conclusion of law 
that such a legally binding agreement came into existence in December, 1993. See Court 
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Finding #4. Contracts for the sale and purchase of shares of stock must contain all the 
elements of a regular contract to be enforceable. As stated by Fletcher on Private 
Corporations: 
The same legal principles govern with regard to the elements of a contract for 
the sale of stock, as applies to contracts generally, and its formation is 
governed by the same legal principles as govern the formation of any other 
contract. 
12A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (hereafter "Fletcher Cyc Corp") 
at § 5566, pp. 5-11 (Perm Ed). See also, Rock v Gustaveson Oil Co., 204 P.96, 97 (Utah 
1922), citing treatise. 
The first element of a contract is "mutual assent or offer and acceptance" between the 
parties. In this case, the evidence and Finding #4 all indicate that any agreement reached in 
December 1993 was between Lathrop and Mann individually. In other words, there is no 
evidence the Company entered into an agreement for 2.5 Million Disputed Shares as part of 
the "deal" between Lathrop and the Company. 
While it is true the Court found Mann "was in control" of the Company in December 
1993 and January 1994, Finding #5, there is no indication, in any written evidence or oral 
testimony, that Mann and the Company were one and the same. Indeed, the undisputed 
evidence is that the Company was a public corporation, although a "shell," with over 125 
shareholders. Ex. P-5. Further, in December, 1993, Lathrop was not in aposition to bind the 
Company to any side deal he struck with Mann. Based on the foregoing, "mutuality of 
assent" is lacking and no agreement to issue the Disputed Shares, therefore, existed. See 
Sparrow v. Tavco Const. Co.. 846 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah App., 1993). 
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The second required element of an agreement is that of consideration. In this case, 
Mann testified the agreement for the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares was for a consulting 
agreement, Ex, P-22 and to ensure that he stayed on with the Company. The problem with 
his view of consideration is that it does not satisfy the requirement that consideration must 
be real and not merely illusory. See Peirce v Peirce. 2000 UT 7, f21, 994 P.2d 193, 199: 
Consideration may be found when there is any act or forbearance bargained for 
and given in exchange for the promise of another. See Resource Mgmt., 706 
P.2d at 1037. Whether an act or forbearance constitutes consideration for a 
contract is a question of law that we review for correctness. See id. We have 
held that [f]or the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to 
constitute the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on 
both parties. When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement 
made in such vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits 
himself to nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory." An illusory 
promise, neither binds the person making it, nor functions as consideration for 
a return promise. 
See also, Id. at f 21 n. 5 ("One of the commonest kinds of promises too indefinite for legal 
enforcement is where the promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later the nature or 
extent of his performance. This unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise and makes 
it illusory.") 
Another element of contract, not found by the trial court, and not supported by the 
record, is sufficient definiteness to enforce an agreement. As stated by Brown's Shoe Fit Co.. 
at 365 n. 8 supra: "One of the fundamental requirements for the enforceability of a contract 
is that its terms be certain enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
(Citation omitted.) If this minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no contract at 
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all." This is especially true where, as here, you have an "oral" agreement. See generally, 
Fletcher Cvc Corp.. at § 5566, pp. 14-15 (Perm Ed). 
Mann effectively conceded the difficulty of finding an enforceable December 1993 
oral agreement, by focusing his attention on the Company's Proxy Statement. Mann testified 
the Proxy Statement was the "agreement" for the Disputed Shares. See R. 1112 at p. 139 (In. 
25), p. 140 (Ins. 1-11). 
With regard to the Proxy Statement, the trial court found that it set forth a "proposal 
to issue 2,500,000 shares of Target to Somerset Group, Inc., a corporation controlled by 
Clealon Mann." Finding #6. As written, the Finding implies that the "Target to Somerset 
deal" was the same as previously agreed to in December 1993, Finding #4. 
The Court's Finding with regard to the Proxy Statement is incorrect. The Proxy 
Statement, which is a disclosure document to stockholders, does not describe any "oral 
agreements" between Lathrop and Mann. To the contrary, the Proxy Statement describes an 
Asset Purchase Agreement [Ex. P-3] entered into between the Company and Lathrop and 
Johnston. The Proxy Statement also describes an "agreement to agree" between the Company 
and Somerset Management, Inc. See, e.g., Ex. P-9 at p. 3. 
Target has agreed to enter into a consulting agreement with Somerset 
Management, Inc., whose president is Clealon Mann, whereby Somerset will 
provide consulting services to the Company for a term of 36 months and will 
receive a total of 2,500,000 shares of restricted stock. 
Although "agreements to agree" may be enforceable under Utah case law, the same 
elements of a regular contract must be found. See Brown's Shoe Fit Co., at 363, supra 
("Unless otherwise provided therein, the agreement to agree is subject to the same analysis 
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that would apply to any other contract with one additional step: Would enforcement of the 
agreement to agree result in a final agreement which would be unenforceable?"). 
Although Mann testified that his entitlement to the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares was 
derived from the Business Consulting Agreement, he conceded that because the Business 
Consulting Agreement, Ex. P-22 did not reference the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares, the only 
"written document" to support the issuance of the shares was the Proxy Statement. See 
R-1112 at p. 166 (Ins. 1 -22). The problem with the Proxy Statement as an "agreement" is that 
it does not contain sufficient detail to satisfy the elements of a binding agreement. It is not 
definite enough to satisfy the requirements for an enforceable contract. Thus, it does not spell 
out, in any detail, what "consulting services" are to be provided by Mann. See Aspenwood, 
LLC v CAT. LLC, 2003 UT App 28 % 28, 73 P.3d 947. 
The trial court's last Finding dealing with an agreement to issue the 2.5 Million 
Disputed Shares is Finding # 13. In that Finding, the trial court states Mann had a "consulting 
agreement" with the Company for the stock. The trial court does not explain when the 
"consulting agreement" came into existence, whether the referenced "consulting agreement" 
was the culmination of the "agreement to agree" referenced in the Proxy Statement, or 
whether or not it was even in writing. At the same time, it could not be the Business 
Consulting Agreement, as the Court erroneously determined that Agreement was not relevant 
to the issues before it. See Conclusion #5. 
Finding # 13 is contrary to Mann's testimony. Mann consistently testified, in response 
to questions from counsel and the trial court itself, that the "consulting agreement" which 
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justified the issuance of the Disputed Shares was the Business Consulting Agreement, Ex. 
P-22, and the Proxy Statement, Ex. P-9. Even when Company's counsel questioned Mann 
about his affidavit in July of 1994 that the 2.5 Million Shares were for a "Financial 
consulting" contract with the Company, see Ex. P-24, Mann responded that "Financial 
Consulting" contract was the same as the Business Consulting Agreement. See R. 1112 at p. 
165 (In. 15), p. 166 (In. 3). 
The Business Consulting Agreement, Ex. P-22, makes no mention that Mann will get 
any shares for consulting services. To the contrary, the Business Consulting Agreement 
specifies that the Company will pay Mann $12,500 per month for 20 hours of consulting 
work per week. See Ex. P-22 at ^ 5. 
In conclusion, even if the Court's findings of fact are not incomplete, inadequate and 
inconsistent, with regard to the existence of an "agreement" by the Company to issue the 
Disputed Shares, the existence of such an "agreement" is not supported by the evidence or 
the law. The trial court's findings of fact, regarding an "agreement," are clearly erroneous. 
II. ANY "AGREEMENT" FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE DISPUTED 
SHARES OF STOCK IS BARRED BY THE ASSET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT 
Unlike the amorphous and ill defined "agreement" relied upon by Mann to justify the 
issuance of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares to Somerset, the Asset Purchase Agreement, 
signed by the Company and Lathrop on December 17, 1993 (Ex. P-3) and approved by the 
Company shareholders on January 18, 1994 is clear and unambiguous as to the deal which 
resulted in the Company buying a patent to the Herpes Devise, Lathrop and Johnston 
-23-
receiving 4.35 Million shares of stock and Lathrop, Johnston and Castleberry being elected 
to the Company's board of directors. The Asset Purchase Agreement makes no reference to 
either Mann, Genie or Somerset receiving 2.5 Million shares of stock, nor does it state that 
Mann, Genie or Somerset has or will obtain a consulting agreement with the company for a 
sum of $12,500 per month for 36 months. The Asset Purchase Agreement is binding upon 
Lathrop as a signatory to the Agreement and upon Mann as he controlled the Company at the 
time of its execution. See Finding #5. Conclusion #4(a). 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
BARS AND VOIDS ANY ORAL AGREEMENT, BUSINESS CONSULTING 
AGREEMENT OR ANY OTHER AGREEMENT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
DISPUTED SHARES. 
As a matter of law, the plain language of the Asset Purchase Agreement bars and 
voids reliance upon any "agreement" entered into on or before January 18, 1994 that is 
contrary to that which is expressly stated in the Asset Purchase Agreement, and the trial court 
erred, as a matter of law, in not voiding and barring the "agreements" referenced in its 
findings of fact as justification for issuance of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares to Somerset. 
The trial court also erred in failing to limit the "consideration" that could support the 
issuance of the shares to exclude activities of Mann encompassed in the affirmative 
statements and warranties Lathrop and the Company (including "Mann") made in the Asset 
Purchase Agreement that no finder's fee was being paid by either party as part of the 
transaction. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated questions of contract interpretation are matters 
of law. See Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, * 1192 (Utah App. 1993) 
(alleged "consultant's agreement too vague to be enforced). 
Appellate court also presume a written agreement is fully integrated and that any side 
agreements or deals are merged into the written agreement. See, e.g., Smith v. Osguthorpe, 
2002 UT App 361, ^ [18, 58 P.3d 854, 857-858. Last, but not least, to determine if parties 
contemplate more than one agreement (multiple agreements), courts look to determine if 
separate consideration supports each agreement. 
In this case, the Asset Purchase Agreement expressly bars the existence of the 
"agreement" now relied upon by Lathrop and Mann to justify issuance of the 2.5 Million 
Disputed Shares. In that regard, Lathrop and Johnston, in the Asset Purchase Agreement 
warrant that there are no "liens, charges or encumbrances upon the Asset," § 1(a). The 
alleged agreement between Lathrop and Mann would constitute such a lien. Target, which 
was controlled by Mann, represents and warrants in the Asset Purchase Agreement that it has 
no "warrants or options to purchase shares of common stock issued and outstanding," § 2(b), 
thereby wiping out any possibility of an option or contract in favor of Mann, Genie or 
Somerset to buy stock. Also, Target represents and warrants that: "Target is not a party to any 
employment contract with any officer, director or stockholder, "§ 2(d), thereby voiding any 
"consultant's agreement" with Mann. Finally, last but not least, the Asset Purchase 
Agreement states in § 14: 
This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements and understandings between 
the parties and may not be changed or terminated orally, and no attempted 
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change, termination or waiver of any of the provisions hereof shall be binding 
unless in writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
To overcome the legal effect of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Mann might argue the 
Asset Purchase Agreement does not bar or void the "agreement" to issue the Disputed Shares 
because the "agreement" was agreed to subsequent to the Asset Purchase Agreement and is 
reflected in the Business Consulting Agreement, Ex. P-22, and Proxy Statement10. The 
argument should fail, however, because it fails to take into consideration the undisputed 
testimony of Mann and Lathrop that the "agreement" was from the beginning and because 
the Asset Purchase Agreement expressly states at § 5(a) and (b) that: 
(a) All representations and warranties of the Sellers and Target 
contained in this Agreement are substantially true and correct on and as of the 
Closing with the same effect as if made on and as of said date. 
(b) As of the Closing there shall have been no material adverse 
change in the affairs, business, property or financial condition of Target. . . 
The date of Closing is not specified in the Asset Purchase Agreement, but it would obviously 
extend beyond the Shareholders' Meeting of January 18, 1994. See §§ 3-5.u. 
Even the Business Consulting Agreement and Proxy Statement were before the 
Shareholders' meeting. Further, to the extent those documents seek to modify the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, without written modification of the Asset Purchase Agreement, would 
10This is possibly what the Trial Court concluded in Conclusion #5, but that is not 
certain given the incompleteness and inadequacy of the findings of fact which do not spell 
out the underlying subsidiary facts of the agreement. 
11
 Closing is to take place prior to January 30,1994, but at the same time is not finished 
until all promises and obligation set forth in the agreement are fulfilled - which technically 
did not take place until after April 11, 1994 when the Company issued the 4.35 Million 
shares of stock to Lathrop and Johnston. 
-26-
have constituted a breach of that Agreement. See, e.g., § 6(f) (Company not to enter into any 
long-term contracts or commitments between January 7,1994 and the Closing); § 7 (Lathrop 
not to do "any act" which might affect the title to the Herpes Devise or give rise to a lien). 
The trial court's only reference to the Asset Purchase Agreement is in its Conclusion 
#6 wherein Judge Noel states: "the Asset Purchase Agreement. . . did not bar Mann from 
entering into an agreement with Target for the issuance of the disputed shares." The trial 
court conclusion, to the extent it does not deal with the timing of the alleged "agreement" and 
the "Closing" date of the Asset Purchase Agreement is in error. There is simply no evidence 
that any "agreement" for issuance of the shares was entered into between Mann and the 
Company following the Shareholders Meeting of January 18, 1994.12 
B. THE ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WARRANTS THAT NO 
"FINDER'S FEE" WILL BE PAID BY EITHER LATHROP OR THE COMPANY, 
WHICH PRECLUDES ACCEPTANCE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF MANN AS 
CONSIDERATION FOR THE DISPUTED SHARES, 
The trial court also committed reversible error when it did not even address the "no 
finder fee" provisions of the Asset Purchase Agreement. This error goes to both the existence 
of an agreement to issue shares and the ultimate legality of the issuance of the Disputed 
Shares as both require consideration. The Asset Purchase Agreement states in three separate 
12In that regard, even though the Proxy Statement notes the existence of an "agreement 
to agree" between Somerset and the Company for consulting services for 36 months, it was 
never put into writing and is not supported by separate consideration from the Business 
Consulting Agreement which called for payments to Mann of $12,500 per month. See Bess 
v Jensen, 782 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 1989) (separate consideration required for each contract). 
-27-
places that no finders' fees are being paid to any party. See §§ 1(g), 2(j), 9. As defined in 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) p. 569, a "finder's fee" is: 
an amount charged for bringing the lender and borrower or issuer and 
underwriter together, or for performing other types of services described under 
Tinder' supra. A finder's fee for a securities issue may be stock or a 
combination of cash and stock. 
Services set forth in the definition of "Finder" definition encompass much of what Mann 
claims he did for the Disputed Shares. Id. at 568-69. 
The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that at least part of the consideration 
given by Mann to the Company for the issuance of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares was 
putting the "deal" together between the Company and Lathrop. In other words, a "finder's 
fee" for finding a deal, i.e., the Herpes Devise - for the Company shell. Lathrop testified, in 
response to questions by Mann's legal counsel, that part of what Mann was supposed to do 
for the shares was: "provide a vehicle for the company to go into the public venue." R. 1113 
at p. 306 (Ins. 3-11).13 Mann also confirmed that part of the consideration for the "consulting 
agreemenf'and for the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares, issued pursuant to that "agreement," was 
for putting the "deal" together. See R.1113 at p. 228 (In. 23); p. 229 (In. 13). See also, 
R.1112atp. 156 (Ins. 7-17); p. 184 (Ins. 19-25). 
The trial court's findings of fact with regard to "consideration" for the issuance of the 
shares is not a model of clarity. Thus, in Finding #13, the trial court states Mann performed 
I3See also, Ex. P-62, wherein Lathrop states in an Affidavit that part of the 
consideration for shares issued to Mann was because he "arranged to acquire a shell company 
for our use." 
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a number of 'Valuable services" for the Company between December 1993 and July 26, 
1994. Without calling the services "consideration", the trial court states such services 
included negotiating the acquisition of the Herpes Devise for the benefit of the Company and 
retaining legal services for preparation of the documents for the proposed agreement to be 
presented to the shareholders. Those services fall under the "no finder's fee" provisions of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement and cannot justify the issuance of the Disputed Shares. 
III. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT APPLYING § 78.211 AND § 78.315 OF 
THE NEVADA REVISED STATUTES TO BAR ISSUANCE OF THE 
DISPUTED SHARES 
The trial court failed to properly interpret and apply the Nevada statutes dealing with 
the directors issuing shares and the procedures and steps the statute mandated. Section 
78.211. Further the trial court did not properly interpret and apply the statutory requirements 
for the directors taking action without a meeting by using an unanimous consent resolution. 
Section 78.315. First, the provisions of § 78.211 are discussed followed by a discussion of 
§ 78.315.14 
Section 78.211 pertains to actions directors must take to issue shares. Section 78.211 
(2) states that the directors must determine that the consideration received or to be received 
is adequate. The first sentence of § 78.211 (2) reads as follows: "Before the corporation 
14Section 78.211 was amended in 2001 which changed subsection 2. The subsection 
quoted above was in effect when the Unanimous Consent Resolution was adopted in April 
11,1994, and when the Company's directors adopted the Unanimous Consent Resolution that 
the Company had not received any consideration for the shares issued to Somerset in April 
2000. 
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issues shares the board of directors must determine that the consideration received or to be 
received for the shares to be issued is adequate." (Emphasis added.)15 
In this matter Exhibits P-18 through P-20 show that the directors failed to make a 
determination regarding the consideration the Company received or that the consideration, 
if any, was adequate. The purpose of § 78.211 is to protect the shareholders of a corporation. 
Also, it protects corporate creditors. 
Corporations are creatures of the state. The Nevada Revised Statutes require that 
directors exercise their powers in good faith and with a view to the interests of the 
corporation. See § 78.138(1). 
The trial court failed to properly interpret and apply the provisions and procedural 
requirements of § 78.211. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court 
addressed § 78.211 at Conclusion #2. In 2(a) the trial court said that § 78.211 did not provide 
a remedy. Inherent in Conclusion #2 is the notion that because § 78.211 had no remedy, the 
trial court is not required to strictly enforce the mandatory statutory requirements. Section 
78.211 does mention a remedy in subsection 4 which deals with shares issued for future 
consideration. The statutory remedy is cancellation of the shares in whole or in part. 
In Foster v. Arata. 325 P.2d 759, 74 Nev. 143 (1958) the Nevada Supreme Court 
consider the fairness of a transaction and the application of the doctrine of estoppel. In Foster 
the Nevada Supreme Court discussed a remedy if the transaction was found to be unfair and 
15The second sentence of subsection 2 is not applicable because in the Unanimous 
Consent Resolution of April 11, 1994 (see Exs. 18, 19,20, and 20A), the directors made no 
determination regarding the consideration the Company received. 
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it said "equity will set it aside." quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306. Thus, if 
§ 78.211 lacks a remedy, equity provides it. 
In Conclusion #2(b) the trial court determined the "intent of the Nevada Legislature" 
as to § 78.211. The trial court had not received any evidence regarding the intent of the 
Nevada Legislature and it appears the trial court made it up. Thus, Conclusion #2 b. states 
"It was not the intent of the Nevada Legislature in adopting this section to permit a 
corporation to rescind shares based on the dereliction by its own Board of Directors of its 
duty thereunder." The trial court's conclusion of law negates the purpose and public policy 
underpinnings of § 78.211 and renders the requirements of the section meaningless. The 
exception fashioned by the trial court totally engulfs the statutory requirements of § 78.211. 
In Conclusion #2(c). the trial court concluded that § 78.211 was satisfied by the 
testimony at trial of two of the three former directors, Johnston and Lathrop. They had not 
been directors of the Company for years, however. Further, Lathrop testified that he had 
recently had business dealings with Mann. Despite this testimony, the Conclusion was that 
"the consideration negotiated and received was adequate exchange for the shares." The trial 
court then quotes the second sentence of subsection 2 which provides that the judgment of 
the board of directors as to the adequacy of consideration is conclusive absent actual fraud 
in the transaction. The trial court is essentially saying that the testimony nine years later in 
2003 by two former directors cured the defect of the directors failing to determine the 
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consideration the Company was receiving for the shares in the Unanimous Consent 
Resolution adopted in 1994.16 
In Conclusion #2 (e) the Court concluded there was no fraud in the transaction that 
resulted in the issuance of the shares to Somerset. This is not correct. Mann, who was not a 
director, changed and altered the Unanimous Consent Resolution without authorization. See 
Ex. 20. Thus, the issuance of the shares to Somerset was by a forged and altered document. 
This is fraud. Also, Castleberry signed the Unanimous Consent Resolution based on Mann's 
misrepresentation. 
In Conclusion #2 the trial court ignored the principle of statutory construction by 
failing to apply the plain meaning of the Nevada statutes. See Mariemont Corporation v. 
White City Water Improvement District, 958 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1998) ("We need not go 
beyond the plain language unless we find that language ambiguous.") 
The plain language of § 78.211 is that the directors must determine the consideration 
and that the consideration is adequate. The language is unambiguous and the trial court 
should have given the statute its plain meaning, and held the Unanimous Consent Resolution 
of April 11, 1994, in whole or in part, was voidable by the Company. 
The other applicable Nevada statute which the trial court ignored is § 78.315 which 
allows directors to take action without a directors' meeting if all the directors in writing 
16The only board of director which determined the consideration for the shares issue 
was the Unanimous Consent Resolution adopted by the directors on April 6,2000 (Ex. P-24). 
This Unanimous Consent Resolution found that the Company had not documents or contracts 
pertaining to any consideration the Company had received from Somerset for the shares. 
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unanimously consent to the action taken. The language of subsection 2 of § 78.315 states as 
follows: 
"...any action required or permitted to be taken at a meeting of the board of 
directors or a committee thereof may be taken without a meeting if, before or 
after the action, a written consent thereto is signed by all the members of the 
board or of the committee." 
All directors must sign an unanimous consent resolution. 
There are at least two versions of the Unanimous Consent Resolution both of which 
have the same signature page. Ex. 18 issues the 2,500,000 shares to Genie Total Products. 
Ex. 19 issues the shares to Somerset Group. Ex. 20 shows who made the change in the 
resolution. Nothing in § 78.315 allows anyone other than a director to sign an unanimous 
consent resolution. At trial George Throckmorton gave his expert opinion as a documents 
examiner. He testified at R.l 112, p. 75, Ins. 15-25 and p. 76, Ins. 1-7 as follows: 
Q. Okay. And what did you conclude, based on your examination? 
A. All three of these documents came from a common source. I never saw the 
original document from whence they came. But they're all the same page, just 
reproduced at different times. [Referring to the signature page.] 
Ex. 20 shows how the Unanimous Consent Resolution was altered. Mann made the 
change and initialed it. See R.l 112, p. 147, Ins. 15-25 and p. 148, Ins. 1-14. Mann testified 
that he made the change because the transfer agent told him to make the change. Actually, 
Mann changed the resolution to conceal his ownership interest. In April 1994, the 2.5 Million 
Disputed Shares represented a significant block of stock. Depending which denominator is 
used, it represented approximately 33 1/3 to 20 per cent of the Company's issued and 
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outstanding shares. The 2.5 Million Disputed Shares issued to Somerset were based on the 
forged and altered Unanimous Consent Resolution. 
Cherie Castleberry testified that she signed only one Unanimous Consent Resolution 
dated April 11, 1994, which issued shares to Genie. R.l 114, p. 464, Ins. 16-22 and p. 466, 
Ins. 8-25. She said that she did not know Somerset in April 1994. Peter Lathrop said that he 
signed two resolutions, Exs. 18 and 19, R.l 113, p. 307, Ins. 21-25. Steven Johnston said he 
could not remember if he signed two resolutions or just one. R.l 113, p. 394, Ins. 9-16. The 
Unanimous Consent Resolution was signed only once and then changed without 
authorization by Mann. This alteration and subsequent uttering of the document is forgery 
and tantamount to fraud. 
In Conclusion of Law # 3(b).the trial court again relied on the trial testimony of 
former directors, Johnston and Lathrop, and concluded that they, who were a majority, that 
they would have authorized the issuance of the shares to Somerset. The Disputed Shares were 
issued by an Unanimous Consent Resolution that should have complied with § 78.315. The 
trial court is making up its own rules while ignoring the specific statutory requirements of 
§78.315. 
Cherie Castleberry testified that she did not know Somerset and that the issuance of 
shares to Somerset would have raised questions with her. At R.1114, p. 467, Ins. 1-18 she 
testified as follows: 
Q. Were you ever asked for you permission to change Genie Total Products to 
Somerset? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you been asked, would you have given your approval? 
A. I would have questioned why Somerset instead of Genie Total Products. 
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Q. So that kind of a question would have raised questions on your behalf; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. And Genie Total Products was conversion of stock, Tim and Brett had 
purchased shares of stocks and needed to be issued stock. Peter and Steve 
were giving the shares for the purchase for the rights to the patent on the 
herpes device, and Brett and yourself were given shares for previous legal 
work beforehand. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So I don't know what Somerset Group would have done for the 2.5, as far 
as assets or services. 
Her testimony shows that not only was there no second consent resolution authorizing 
the issuance of the 2,500,000 Shares to Somerset, and that such a resolution would not have 
been signed by Cherie Castleberry because she had no idea who Somerset was or what 
Somerset provided to the Company. 
When the provisions of § 78.211 and § 78.315 are read together, the simple reading 
shows the inadequacy and blatant statutory violations condoned by the trial court in its 
Conclusions of Law numbers 2 and 3. 
IV. MANN, A FIDUCIARY, FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO ESTABLISH ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
DISPUTED SHARES AND TO PROVE THE INHERENT FAIRNESS 
OF THE TRANSACTION. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW TO THE CONTRARY ARE IN ERROR. 
On the morning of the last day of trial, and after the conclusion of the Company' s case 
in chief, the trial court ruled the Company had made out a prima facie case of a fiduciary 
responsibility of Mann and shifted the burden of proof to Mann. The trial court was correct 
in its decision. In other words, although Mann did not have absolute control of the Company, 
at the time the "agreement" to issue shares was made in December 1993 -January 1994, he 
had a fiduciary obligation to the Company. R.l 115 at p. 570-573. 
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Mann's counsel argued, at the end of the case, the critical time period was not 
December 1993-January 199417 but rather April 11, 1994 when the Unanimous Consent 
Resolution was approved.18 The trial court agreed, and overturned his previous decision that 
the resolution was merely a formality to give effect to the earlier "agreement." The basis of 
the trial court's reversal was its finding "Lathrop and Johnston owned 4,350,000 of the 
Company's outstanding shares" Finding #10. 
The Court's Finding is in error as Lathrop and Johnston did not own the 4.35 Million 
shares until after the Unanimous Consent Resolution of April 11,1994. See R. 1113 at p. 241 
(ln.21); p. 242 (In. 6). At the same time, unlike Mann, Lathrop and Johnston had paid 
consideration for their shares by April 11, 1994, and they had a contract right to the shares. 
The trial court's conclusion is still wrong at law. 
A. MANN, THROUGHOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
COMPANY, HAD A CONTROLLING INTEREST IN THE COMPANY, WAS A DE 
FACTO OFFICER OF THE COMPANY, AND HAD A CONTINUING FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATION TO THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS. 
Whether or not an individual has sufficient "control" of a corporation , to justify 
placing the burden upon him or her to prove the inherent fairness of transactions with the 
corporation, does not turn on the mere percentage of ownership. Unlike small closely held 
corporations, the public traded corporation, such as the situation in this case, can be 
17This was important to Mann's counsel since he conceded it was likely any 
"agreement" reached to give Mann the disputed shares, prior to April 11,1994, was probably 
unenforceable. SeeR.1115 at p. 604 (In. 24); p. 605 (In. 2); p. 610 (Ins. 3-17). 
18See argument at Section III as to the deficiencies of the alleged Unanimous Consent 
Resolution. 
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"controlled" by shareholders owning significantly less than a majority of the outstanding 
shares of the company. Thus, Mann, through Genie, had a undisputed "controlling interest" 
in the Company up to the actual issuance of the 4.35 million shares of Company stock to 
Lathrop and Johnston. Even then, if Mann had an agreement to the Disputed Shares, Mann 
still had a controlling interest.19 
Percentage of stock ownership is only one factor to consider, however. See Drobbin 
v Niolet Instrument Corp 631 F. Supp. 860, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), dealing with a Nevada 
corporation, "independent representation of a corporation must be one not merely of form 
but of substance." Quoting Feuer, Personal Liabilities of Corporate Officers and Directors 
(1962). 
Not only did Mann own and claim rights to between 24% to 31% of the outstanding 
shares of the Corporation, but the undisputed testimony is that during the time that Mann was 
with the Company, he was a de facto officer of the Company. Lathrop testified that Mann 
was the equivalent to the Chief Financial Officer of the Company. R.l 113 at p. 334 (Ins. 
5-7). Castleberry testified to the same effect. R. 1114 at p. 484 (In. 8). See also the Business 
Consulting Agreement, Ex. P-22, where the Company is to pay Mann $ 12,500 per month "for 
19Putting to the side additional sales and purchases of shares, and assuming the total 
outstanding shares of the Company, as of the morning of April 18, 1994, was the same as of 
the shareholders meeting of January 18, 1994, then the issuance of the 4.35 million shares 
to Lathrop and Johnston and the issuance of shares to Mann of 2.4 million would raise 
Mann's interest in the Company to 31 % and Lathrop to 33%. [Mann -1,250,000 + 2,500,000 
= 3,750,000 divided by outstanding shares of 12,064,000 (5,214,000 + 4,350,000 
+2,500,000) = 31%]. 
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work performed in accordance with this Agreement until a CEO his [sic] is hired and six 
thousand two hundred and fifty ($6,250) per month thereafter."20 
The law is clear that directors, controlling shareholder and officers of a corporation 
have a fiduciary obligation to the corporation and its shareholders. 
Nevada follows corporate law rules "of well-nigh universal application," id* 
325 P.2d at 764. Thus in Foster v. Arata the Nevada supreme court quoted and 
applied Justice Douglas's oft-quoted language in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 
295,306,60 S.Ct. 238,245,84 L.Ed. 281 (1939):" 'A director is a fiduciary.... 
So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders.... Their 
powers are powers in trust.... Their dealings with the corporation are subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the 
corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only 
to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness 
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.... The 
essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction 
carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity will set 
it aside.' "325 P.2d at 765. 
Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.. 631 F.Supp. 860, 879 (S.D.N.Y.,1986). 
B. MANN FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE THE INHERENT FAIRNESS AND ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION 
FOR THE TRANSACTION. 
Once a prima facie case is established of self-dealing, as happened in this action, the 
interested director, officer or controlling shareholder has the burden of proof "to demonstrate 
that the transaction is fair and serves the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 
. . . This is rule of wide application. The parties do not suggest that Nevada law differs." Id. 
20When Mann sued to collect on the Business Consulting Agreement he sought 
damages for the full $12,500 per month - thus indicating he was acting as de facto CEO. See 
Complaints - Plaintiff Exhibits 1,2 & 3 in August 10,2000 Hearing before Judge Noel in this 
case [copies included in record from Clerk of the Court]. 
-38-
at 880 (emphasis added). The Drobbin court goes on to state: "All aspects of the issue must 
be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.") Id- at 880. 
The proof for both the adequacy of the consideration and the inherent fairness of the 
transaction must be judged on an objective standard. Further, in dealing with the issue, the 
rights and protection of minority shareholders must be taken into consideration. See, e.g., 
U.S. v. Skeddle. 940 F.Supp. 1146, 1151 (N.D.Ohio, 1996) ("The inherent fairness to the 
corporation is to be judged by an objective standard."); Lynch v. Cook, 196 Cal.Rptr. 544, 
550 - 551 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 1983) ("dealings with the minority shareholders are subject to 
rigorous scrutiny"). 
In this case, the trial court ruled that Mann did not have to meet the foregoing burden. 
At the same time, the trial court concluded he would determine the burden had been met. See 
Conclusion #4(b) and (d). The trial court's conclusions of law are in error. 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Not Applying an Objective Standard to 
Determine the Inherent Fairness of the 2.5 Million Disputed Share Transaction and 
in Not Addressing the Interests of Minority Shareholders. 
The trial court's main reason for ruling against the Company appears to be based upon 
its reliance upon "after-the-fact" testimony of two of the three former members of the Board 
of Directors. In doing so, the trial court has not properly applied the legal requirement that 
the 2.5 Million Disputed Share transaction be analyzed from an objective standard. The 
"after-the-fact" subjective opinions of former directors do not meet that standard. The trial 
court's determination also fails to take into consideration the rights of the minority 
shareholders in the Company, at the time of the transaction. Those minority shareholders 
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numbered in excess of 100, and had the right to expect that the Board of Directors, officers 
(including de facto officers) and controlling shareholders would not take advantage of them. 
Neither the Court, Lathrop nor Mann appears to give any thought as to what impact the 
decision to issue 2.5 million additional shares would have on the ownership interests of 
minority shareholders.21 
2. The Trial Court Erred in Determining, as a Matter of Law, the Inherent 
Fairness of the Transaction and Adequacy of Consideration Based upon Value of the 
Stock. 
A review of the trial court's Findings and Conclusions reveal the court's primary 
reason for finding fairness and adequate consideration is because, in its opinion, any value 
of Company's stock was "due primarily to the efforts of Mann, who negotiated the 
acquisition of the Herpes Devise and provided the bulk of the operating capital of the 
Company." See Finding #14. See related Conclusion #4(d). Even if true, it does not justify 
the fairness of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares transaction and further demonstrates a lack 
of understanding of public corporations and "shells." 
Prior to Mann's negotiations with Lathrop for acquisition of the Herpes Devise for the 
Company, Mann owned, through Genie 1.25 million shares of stock in the Company. The 
Company was a "shell" looking for a home. The acquisition of the Herpes Devise provided 
21Mann's and Lathrop's testimony as to how they determined the number of shares 
Mann should get showed their utter lack of interest in the minority shareholders. Thus, 
Lathrop testified the decision on how many shares to issue was based on the concept of 
dividing the "whole pie." See R.l 113 p. 382 (Ins. 16-24). Further, as long as he had more 
voting power than Mann it didn't matter what Mann was getting. See R. 1113 at p.334 (In. 
14); p. 335 (In. 10). 
-40-
that home, and the value of the Company's shares was enhanced, including the 1.25 million 
Mann/Genie shares. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the undisputed testimony is that after the Company 
"shell" found a home (for which no finder's fee would be paid) the value of Company shares 
was $0.7 per share. Thus, Mann sold and bought shares at $.07 per share.22 See, e.g., R. 1113 
at p. 379 (In. 17). Now $.07 per share may not appear to the trial court to be "significant 
value" but when it is multiplied against the shares owned or controlled by Mann it becomes 
significant. Thus, the 1.25 million shares of Company stock that Mann owned, through 
Genie, became worth $87,500 upon the acquisition of the Herpes Devise.23 
It is this lack of understanding of the value of corporate stock that undercuts the trial 
court's conclusion of law that Mann was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, 
both the adequacy of the consideration received, and the inherent fairness of the transaction. 
By ignoring the undisputed $.07 value/share evidence, the trial court was able to rule as it 
did. 
The value of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares was $175,000. No where in the record 
is there evidence that Mann provided services from January 18, 1994 through July 24, 1994 
sufficient to justify, to either the Company or to minority shareholders, applying an objective 
22Contrary to the Court's Finding #14 and Conclusion #4(d)(iii), Mann did not 
individually provide must of the funds for the operation of the Company. Rather he got 
investors to place money into the Company, for which he received a 15% commission. See 
Exs, P-15andP-47. 
23No wonder the Asset Purchase Agreement specified "no finder's fee." Mann had 
already achieved a $87,500 pay day upon passage of the Agreement. 
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standard, a windfall of $175,000. Further, the "fairness" of the transaction is further undercut 
by existence of other "agreements" and "understandings" by which Mann was to receive 
compensation for performing the exact same services as he, and Lathrop, subjectively 
believed justified the Disputed Shares. 
Examples of those other "agreements" and "understandings" are found in the Business 
Consulting Agreement, together with Addendum, and Mann's alleged entitlement to a 15% 
commission or finder's fee for money he raised for the Company. The Business Consulting 
Agreement, Ex. P-22, calls for Mann to provide consulting services and raise funds for the 
Company, all in exchange for a salary of $12,500 per month.24 In addition, he had an 
"agreement" to get a 15% commission or finder's fee for funds raised for the Company. 
Finally, for the exact services for which he is now claiming entitlement to the 2.5 Million 
Disputed Shares, Mann obtained an Addendum, attached to the Business Consulting 
Agreement, entitling him to the infomercial marketing rights to the Herpes Devise. Ex. P-22 
[last page]; See also R. 1112 at p. 132 (In. 14); p. 134 (In. 12). Indeed, Mann testified he got 
the marketing rights for giving Lathrop control of the Company, R.l 112 at p. 135 (In, 23); 
p. 136 (In. 14), which is directly contrary to the no finder's fee provisions of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. 
The fact that Mann did not timely seek to enforce that agreement, does not change 
the fact of the obligation—indeed, Mann testified he still intends to sue on the Business 
Consulting Agreement. R.l 112 at p. 180 (Ins. 4-5). 
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V- THE BUSINESS CONSULTING AGREEMENT IS RELEVANT. 
Although Mann testified repeatedly that the Business Consulting Agreement was part 
of the consideration for the issuance of the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares, the trial court in its 
Conclusion # 5 held that it was "not relevant to the issues raised herein." The basis for the 
ruling was that "Mann never received any payment under this agreement" and nothing in the 
agreement was fatal to Mann's claims. Although trial court's enjoy broad discretion with 
regard to rulings on relevance, the rulings can and should be reversed where either the 
discretion has been abused or a mistake made. In this case, the Business Consulting 
Agreement is the only written agreement which gives Mann anything for his services. Those 
services, as set forth in the plain language of the Agreement specify Mann's duties as a 
consultant and what compensation he was to receive for performance of those duties. Indeed, 
the mere existence of the Business Consulting Agreement would indicate an assumption that 
no other "consulting agreement" existed between the Company and Mann. The mere fact that 
Mann did not preserve his rights to sue on the Agreement, due to the passage of the 
limitations period set forth in the Agreement, is not the fault of the Company, and Mann 
should not now be allowed be benefit from him dilatory conduct. Finally, Mann testified, 
both at trial and through affidavit, Ex. P-24, that the issuance of the 2.5 Million Disputed 
Shares were pursuant to the Business Consulting Agreement, and references to a "financial 
consulting agreement" referred to the Business Consulting Agreement. 
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VI. IF THE DISPUTED SHARES WERE ISSUED FOR FUTURE 
CONSIDERATION, THEN THE SHARES MUST BE APPORTIONED 
The evidence shows that if a consulting agreement existed between Somerset, Genie 
or Mann and the Company it was for future consulting services for a term of thirty-six 
months. The trial court should have apportioned the shares based on the length of time Mann 
provided consulting services.25 Thus, the Company terminated Mann's relationship with the 
Company on July 26, 1994 and Mann failed to provide consulting services for the full 
36-month term. 
Fundamental fairness required apportionment. Further, because the shares issued on 
April 11, 1994, bore a restricted legend, this suggests that § 78.211 of the Nevada Revised 
Statutes applied. The restricted legend limited the negotiability of the certificates evidencing 
the shares. This meant that before the shares could in any way be transferred, the holder 
would submit the certificates to the Company or its transfer agent with a request to have the 
restricted legend removed. NRS § 78.211(4) provides for apportionment where shares are 
issued for contracts for future services. 
The date of the Company's shareholders' meeting was January 18,1994, If that date 
is used as Mann's starting date, then Mann provided services until July 26, 1994, or a time 
period of approximately six months. Six months of thirty-six months is approximately 
25The marshaling requirement regarding the existence of an agreement between 
Somerset, Genie, or Mann and the Company is previously covered in the Legal Argument 
and will not be repeated. 
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seventeen per cent (17%). Using this percentage Mann would be entitled based on a just and 
equitable apportionment to 425,000 shares, prior to the 20 into 1 reverse split. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING "DELAY" TO RULE 
AGAINST THE COMPANY 
The trial court wrongfully relied on delay in rejecting the Company's claims. In 
Conclusion #4(vi) the trial court said that the delay "belied" the Company's claim of 
inadequate consideration and that the delay further weakened the claim. The trial court's 
conclusion of law is incorrect. The standard of review is correctness. 
The Company concedes that almost six years elapsed from the issuance of the shares 
in 1994 to the filing of the lawsuit in 2000. Vivian Liu testified about the reasons for the 
delay. This lawsuit was brought within the statute of limitations. See R.889-898 and 891-892. 
Defendants in the Pretrial Order made no mention of "delay" or "laches" of the "statute of 
limitations." 
Delay or laches is an equitable defense. To establish them a party must show that they 
were disadvantage or prejudiced by the delay. Regardless, when a matter is brought within 
the statute of limitations that is sufficient. See Doit Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., et aL 926 
P.2d 825, 845 (Utah 1996). See also, Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping 
Center Associates. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). 
In Hatch v. Hatch, 148 P. 1096 (Utah 1915) the Supreme Court discussed laches and 
the statute of limitations. It stated at 1101 as follows: "Generally in the state courts, the 
statutes of limitations, applies to equitable as well as legal actions, and in the absence of 
estoppel or prejudice, mere lapse of time short of the statute of limitation does not bar relief." 
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(Citations omitted.) The trial court use of "delay" as a basis to "find against the Plaintiff and 
in favor of the Defendants on Plaintiffs Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief is error. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE FRAUD 
INDICTMENT AGAINST MANN 
The Company offered into evidence P-32 which is a nine count felony indictment 
against Mann in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah captioned United States of 
America v. Clealon Mann, File No. 2:02CR 0741 TC which was returned by the federal 
grand jury . See R.1114, p. 496, Ins. 5-15 and 21-25 and p. 497, Ins. 1-17. The federal 
indictment was offered under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 404 (b) allows 
evidence pertaining to bad acts showing such things as notice, preparation, plan or 
knowledge. 
Mann's attorney objected on the basis that the indictment was not admissible as 
evidence of prior bad acts until it was resolved. The indictment was offered by the Company 
to show that Mann made misrepresentations in connection with securities and financial 
transactions and to corroborate Castleberry's testimony. The trial court sustained Mann's 
objection. R.l 114, p. 496, Ins. 5-25 andp. 497, Ins. 1-21. The trial court abused its discretion 
in not admitting the indictment into evidence. This Court can take judicial notice that Mann 
pled guilty to one count of the indictment and is now serving a five-year term in a federal 
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prison. An indictment is competent evidence. It is a finding of probable cause by a grand 
jury. The indictment had probative value and should have been admitted by the trial court.26 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER 
TESTIMONY OF CASTLEBERRY, AND THE COMPANY'S CLAIMS 
BASED THEREON 
Cherie Castleberry was one of the three directors who signed the Unanimous Consent 
Resolution, Ex. P-18 that issued the 2,500,000 shares to Genie. Castleberry testified that 
Mann prepared the Unanimous Consent Resolution and faxed it to her in San Diego. She said 
she did not sign a second resolution. She said that any shares issued to Somerset would have 
raised questions for her. In that regard, she did not know what Somerset would have done to 
earn the 2,500,000 shares. Further, she said that in 1994 she did not know Mann's 
relationship to Genie. She testified that in April 1994 she had not heard of Somerset and did 
not know if Mann controlled Somerset. 
The trial court, in Finding #11, erroneously ruled that Castleberry's testimony 
regarding Mann's statement were claims based on fraud, misrepresentation, and mis-
statement and had not been plead with particularity and not properly preserved in the Pre-trial 
Order. The trial court then disallowed the claims. The court also stated, without explanation, 
26The trial court when determining admissibility of evidence should have applied a 
four-part test, (1) evidence was offered for a proper purpose, (2) evidence was relevant, (3) 
trial court determined that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by its 
potential for unfair prejudice, and (4) trial court gave jury proper limiting instructions upon 
request. See U.S. v. Shumwav. 112 F.3d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1994); U. S. v. Reddeck. 22 
F.3d 1504,1509 (10th Cir. 1997); State v. Pirela. 65 P.3d 307,312 cert. den. 72 P.3d 685; and 
Huddleston v. U.S.. 485 U.S. 681.691-692; 108 S.Ct. 1496.99 L.Ed2d 771 (1988). From the 
record it appears that the trial court took none of the four steps. 
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or reason that Castleberry's testimony about misrepresentation claims was not credible. This 
evidentiary ruling is an abuse of discretion. 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is limited by its express terms to fraud and 
mistake, not misrepresentations and mis-statements. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court after the fact to bar the Company's misrepresentation claim. At trial, Defendants failed 
to timely object to Castleberry misrepresentation testimony and therefor waived any 
objection. 
The Company preserved the misrepresentation issue and presented Castleberry to 
show that because her signature to the Unanimous Consent Resolution had been obtained by 
misrepresentation, the signature was not valid, thereby negating the resolution. 
Misrepresentation claims are plead on the notice standard. See Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Company reserved the issue of the validity of the Unanimous Consent 
Resolution in the Pretrial Order. See R.890, R.893, and R.894. 
Any defect in the pleading was remedied when the Company took Castleberry's 
deposition on December 8, 2000. Her testimony regarding Mann's statements to her were 
clear. Mann and his former counsel, Mr. Ted Kannel attended and participated in the 
deposition. Defendants never claimed any prejudice. See Castleberry deposition of 
December, 2000 at the following citations. Page 30, lines 12 through 22, (hereafter 
30:12-22); 34:19-22; 75:25, 76:1-14; and 85:10-16. Indeed, at trial, rather than object to 
Castleberry's testimony, Mann re-took the stand. He did not rebut her testimony, however, 
and made no attempt to contradict the testimony as to the misrepresentation. 
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When contract principles are considered regarding signatures on documents, a 
signature based on misrepresentation is not valid. See Berkeley Bank for Cooperative v. 
Meibos, 607 P.2d 798,803 (1980). Ms. Castleberry's misunderstanding regarding the reason 
for the issuance of the shares to Genie renders her signature to the Unanimous Consent 
Resolution invalid. The Court reliance upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) does not 
detract from that claim. Thus, Rule 9(b) issues are usually raised by a party, as parties can 
waive the matter. Here the Company's Complaint was filed in April 2000 and the objection 
was first made by the trial court in August 2003 at closing argument, after the parties had 
rested. See R.l 115, p. 629 (Ins. 3-6); p. 580 (In. 16). 
The trial court also found that Ms. Castleberry's testimony was not credible on the 
misrepresentation issue. (The trial court did not say the same with regard to other issue, such 
as her testimony she only signed once.) Credibility is a discretionary issue, but can be 
reversed if abuse has occurred, or if, as in this case, the trial court throws out the statement 
merely to justify an erroneous conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Company respectfully requests that either the 
Appellate Court reverse the trial court based upon the written agreements and Nevada 
Statutes and also for the other reasons set forth herein. The Court of Appeals may also 
remand the matter back to the trial court to correct the mistakes in the evidentiary rulings, as 
well as in the Findings and Conclusions and also, to apportion the Disputed Shares if that is 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
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, 2005. 
Paul H. Ashtor 
Wallace T. Boyack J 
Attorneys for NexMed, Inc., Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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